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Leonhardt: It's Reasonable to Expect Privacy

IT’S REASONABLE TO EXPECT PRIVACY WHEN WATCHING
ADULT VIDEOS
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK COUNTY
People v. Hemmings1
(decided January 12, 2012)
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The New York City Police Department organized and conducted a buy-and-bust operation in New York City, resulting in a
positive identification of the defendant, subsequent arrest, and simultaneous seizure of certain illegal contraband found on his person.2
The ghost officer in the operation, who shadowed the primary undercover officer, surveyed both the primary undercover officer and the
suspect for approximately thirty minutes before each entered an adult
DVD store.3 Soon after entering, the undercover officer exited the
store and signaled to the ghost officer that he had purchased narcotics
from the suspect (later identified as the defendant), which prompted
the ghost officer alongside his undercover team to enter the premises.4 After searching the first and third floors and finding no signs of
the suspect, the ghost officer and his team proceeded to the second
floor where they found approximately eight to ten viewing booths designed for watching pornographic material.5
Each booth had a door six to seven feet in height that
“[a]lmost reached the floor and which could be locked.”6 Of those
eight to ten booths, only two were closed, which prevented the ghost
1

937 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
Id. at 551. This was conducted in the Times Square area early in the morning on February 16, 2011. Id.
3
Id. While the suspect did fit a certain profile, stocky with a leather jacket, the ghost officer did not see the face of the suspect. Id.
4
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
5
Id.
6
Id.
2
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officer from seeing who was inside.7 According to the ghost officer,
he approached the first booth with a closed door, discovered it was
unlocked, and without knocking entered the booth and told the person
inside to come out.8 Upon doing so, the officer acknowledged that he
was unsure if the person inside the booth was the suspect he had been
following, but further observed that there was a leather jacket and
knapsack on the floor of the booth.9 The ghost officer then proceeded
to the second booth with a closed door and ordered that occupant to
come out.10 The officer noted that the suspect in the second booth
clearly did not match the description of the suspect he had been following earlier and therefore let the second man go.11 At that point
the ghost officer led the individual from the first booth outside where
he was then identified by the primary undercover officer as the man
who sold him the narcotics, the defendant in this case.12 Upon identification, the defendant was searched and forty-six dollars was recovered from his person. In addition to the money, the officers also
seized the black leather jacket and knapsack belonging to the defendant which were discovered in his booth.13
At trial, the defendant sought to suppress both the evidence
recovered by law enforcement as well as the identification by the
primary undercover officer, alleging that “the police did not act lawfully because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
booth.”14 Further, urging the court’s application of the exclusionary
rule, the defendant sought to suppress both the identification and evidence retrieved from his person, as the ill-gotten fruit of a poisonous
tree.15
7

Id. at 551-52.
Id. at 552.
9
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 552.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. This was done from a car-length away and while the defendant was in police custody. Id.
13
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 552. The black leather jacket and the knapsack had been
on the floor of the booth. Id.
14
Id. at 551-52 (noting that this would certainly cover the physical evidence if successful).
15
Id. at 556 (“Where the police lack probable cause, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the confirmatory identification.”); see also People v. Gethers, 654 N.E.2d 102,
103 (N.Y. 1995) (noting that evidence recovered without probable cause is inadmissible);
United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1980) (noting that the Court of Appeals
agreed that the trial court was correct in ruling that the evidence was obtained without probable cause).
8
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The court granted the defendant’s application to suppress the
identification and the physical evidence, finding each was obtained
unlawfully.16 In making its determination, the court looked to the explicit language of the Fourth Amendment, which specifically states:
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.17
Based upon the protections afforded therein, the court arrived
at two conclusions of law.18 First, over the People’s objections, the
court found that the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy while occupying a closed viewing booth inside of the adult video
store.19 Second, that the mere fact that “a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy does not shield him from investigation by
the police, but it [nevertheless] requires that before they may negate
the privacy interest, they must have a sufficient basis to do so and
must act reasonably.”20
With respect to the court’s first conclusion, in an attempt to
save both the identification and physical evidence from suppression,
the People argued, that while the defendant inarguably maintained a
subjective expectation of privacy inside the booth, his expectation
was not one that “society recognizes as reasonable.”21 In support of
this position, the People relied on precedent which provides in pertinent part that “[p]ublic areas of commercial premises are not afforded
Fourth Amendment protection.”22 Despite acknowledging that privacy may be afforded to an individual who, even though occupying a
public space, takes reasonable steps to safeguard his or her privacy,
the People insisted that “the defendant lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the booth in this instance . . . because he did not

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 553-54.
Id. at 552-53.
Id. at 554 (citing People v. Mercado, 501 N.E.2d 27 (1986)).
Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
Id. at 553.
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lock the door to the booth.”23
The court rejected both of the People’s arguments, explaining
at the outset that the presence, absence, or ultimate use “of a lock is
not a determinative factor in deciding whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”24 Rather, the court recognized that
courts tend to construe an expectation of privacy as reasonable based
upon “the nature of the activity involved, not the precise physical
characteristics of the enclosure.”25 Thus, the court in Hemmings determined that the defendant’s expectation of privacy was “objectively
justifiable,”26 explaining it as analogous to the degree of privacy reasonably afforded to an individual occupying a toilet stall, bedroom, or
room wherein an individual intends to change his or her articles of
clothing.27
With respect to the second conclusion, the court held that although an individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy, he
or she is automatically shielded “from investigation by the police, but
rather that before the police “negate a privacy interest, they must
have a sufficient basis to do so and must act reasonably.”28 In turn,
the court observed, as the New York Court of Appeals found in People v. Mercado,29 where the circumstances presented are sufficient to
give the police “probable cause to believe that criminal activity [is]
taking place in the [place to be searched]”, a search may be deemed
reasonable notwithstanding an intrusion upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.30 Likewise, the court recognized the exigencies surrounding the situation might also justify the intrusion upon an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.31
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 553.
Id. (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29).
Id.
Id. at 552 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. 347).
Id. at 552-53 (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29).
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29).
501 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1986).
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 554 (citing Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29). The court clari-

fied:
[I]n passing on whether there was probable cause for an arrest, we consistently have made it plain that the basis for such a belief must not only
be reasonable, but it must appear to be at least more likely than not that a
crime has taken place and that the one arrested is its perpetrator.
Id. at 555 (quoting People v. Carrasquillo, 429 N.E.2d 775, 778 (N.Y. 1981)).
31
Id. (citing Kroehler v. Scott, 391 F. Supp. 1114, 1119 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (“The Fourth
Amendment requires, at a minimum, the determination by a detached official that there is
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In this regard, the court noted that the police had reason to believe that the suspect was in the adult video store and had facts pertaining to the suspect’s physical description, i.e., the police “knew
that the [suspect] had a stocky build and was wearing a dark leather
jacket.”32 Yet, the information and knowledge upon which the police
relied was not enough to provide probable cause.33 Furthermore, the
court noted that the police “had no basis to believe that [the defendant] knew that [the police] had observed the drug sale or was aware
of their presence”, and thus, they lacked justifiable concern that the
defendant would attempt to escape.”34 Therefore, emphasizing (i) the
overwhelming police presence throughout the store; (ii) the lack of
danger to the police or risk of evidence being destroyed, or (iii) reason to believe that the defendant “was engaged in criminal activity
while he was in the booth,” the court found no exigent circumstances
to justify the search.35 Rather, the court explained that “[t]he police
could have simply waited a short while and apprehended [the defendant] [] as he walked away from the booth.”36
In turn, having found that “the defendant had an expectation
of privacy in the booth” and that “the police did not act reasonably
under the circumstances”, the court ruled to suppress both the defendant’s identification and physical evidence retrieved by the police
at trial.37 The court arrived at this conclusion in spite of the People’s
argument that because “the identification took place outside the video
store, the taint stemming from [the] improper seizure was attenuated”, and thus, did not require suppression under the exclusionary
rule.38 In rejecting this contention, the court distinguished the precedent that the People relied upon, noting that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant in the instant case. 39 However, the
probable cause warranting a search prior to its commencement, or at least the presence of
those rare exigent circumstances which justify a warrantless search.”).
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 555-56 (observing that defendant “was certainly not attempting to escape from them, as he had closeted himself in a confined area with only one
means of egress”).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 556.
37
Id.
38
Id. (citing People v. Ramos, 613 N.Y.S.2d 870, 873 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994) (“The
fact that the identification took place after the parties left the apartment sufficiently dissipated the taint of the warrantless entry.”).
39
Compare Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (noting that the police did not have probable
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court further acknowledged that the primary undercover officer might
still be able to identify the defendant at trial, and ordered an independent source hearing be held to rule on said matter.40
There is little precedent directly on point regarding the expectation of privacy that one is entitled to while occupying a closed video booth within an adult video store, as was at issue in Hemmings.
However, the court considered the appropriate, related precedent pertaining to the Fourth Amendment protections that are guaranteed to
individuals in places similarly occupied for the purpose of engaging
in activities that are intimate in nature, and thus, society recognizes as
warranting an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. This
case note explores the present standard used to determine when the
Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s expectation of privacy
and the exclusionary rule’s impact upon search and seizure jurisprudence. Moreover, this case note considers how probable cause, exigent circumstances, and the lapse of time impact a court’s decision in
whether (i) governmental action was reasonable under the circumstances, and (ii) suppression is the appropriate remedy as a result of
unlawful government action.
II.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH
A.

Redefining the Protections Afforded by the Fourth
Amendment

Although there exists good precedent that a person cannot
maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in activities or information exposed to the public at large,41 the United States Supreme
cause to make the arrest), with Ramos, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 873 (noting that “the only illegality
attaching to defendant’s arrest [was] that it was made after the police, without a warrant, improperly entered premises in which defendant had an expectation of privacy, notwithstanding
that the record amply support[ed] that the police had probable cause to make such arrest at
that time”).
40
Hemmings, 937 N.Y.S.2d at 556 (citing Crews, 445 U.S. at 477). In Crews, although
the court determined that the police could not introduce “[t]he pretrial identification obtained
through use of [a] photograph take during respondent’s illegal detention”, the Court nevertheless held that “the in-court identification [was] admissible . . . because the police’s
knowledge of respondent’s identity and the victim’s independent recollections of him both
antedated the unlawful arrest and were thus untainted by the constitutional violation.”
Crews, 445 U.S. at 477.
41
See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (recognizing that “when . . .
the home is converted into a commercial center to which outsiders are invited for purposes
of transacting unlawful business, that business is entitled to no greater sanctity than if it were
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Court clarified in United States v. Katz,42 that what an individual
“seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected.”43 The Court noted that although
its earlier interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was more restrictive, construing it to protect “only searches and seizures of tangible
property . . . ‘the premise that property interests control the right of
the Government to search and seize has been discredited.’ ”44 Thus,
contrary to what the government argued, “the absence of such [physical] penetration . . . [did not] foreclose further Fourth Amendment inquiry.”45
In Katz, the government monitored a person’s phone calls inside a public telephone booth.46 Notwithstanding the fact that the
electronic listening device used by the government made no physical
intrusion into the booth, as it was attached to the exterior of the booth
occupied by the defendant, the Court recognized that the government’s surveillance was an intrusion into the defendant’s privacy.47
Moreover, the Court observed, while the defendant was visible to onlookers because the booth was made of glass, the defendant did not
intend to prevent others from seeing him, but rather, sought to prevent them from hearing him.48 In turn, the Court reasoned that the
defendant, while occupying the public telephone booth, had a reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment.49
The Court explained that a person in a telephone booth who “[s]huts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call
is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”50
carried on in a store, a garage, a car, or on the street”).
42
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
43
Id. at 352.
44
Id. at 353 (quoting Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)).
45
Id. (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457 (1928), overruled in part by
Katz, 389 U.S. 347).
46
Id. at 348 (noting that the evidence obtained via surveillance showed that the defendant
conveyed wagering information from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston in violation of federal statute).
47
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49, 352 (noting that “[t]o read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication”).
48
Id. at 352 (observing that the court agreed with the government that the booth allowed
the defendant to be seen).
49
Id.
50
Id.
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Although the Court in Katz reiterated the principle that “the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply ‘areas’-against
unreasonable searches and seizures”, the Court’s holding demonstrates that the place which a person occupies is nevertheless a pertinent factor in deciding whether a person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy.51 This notion is also illustrated in Kroehler v.
Scott,52 in which the district court reviewed the constitutionality of
“covert police observation of activities undertaken in toilet stalls in
public restrooms.”53
In Kroehler, “in response to complaints of homosexual and
drug-related activity occurring in the public men’s room at the Penn
Central Railroad Station and at Long Park, [the government] initiated
a program of surveillance designed to . . . apprehend persons involved in these criminal activities.”54 Under the program, “holes
were drilled in the ceilings directly above the toilet stalls”, enabling
the government actors who implemented the program “to peer covertly into the stall[s] below and observe, unnoticed, whatever transpired.”55 Those persons apprehended as a result of these observations filed suit, arguing that the surveillance program violated their
right to privacy.56 Specifically, those apprehended alleged the program was unconstitutional because it was implemented “without [the
government actors] first obtaining a search warrant based upon a
showing of probable cause that criminal activity was taking place
therein or demonstrating at least the exigent circumstances which
suspend the requirement of a warrant.57 In response, the government
relied heavily on “the circumstances which gave rise to the surveillance—namely, numerous complaints of criminal activities”, and
urged the court find “the surveillance in question[] constitutionally
proper, prompted by the threat thus posed to the innocent public.”58
Ultimately, the court concluded that a person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy while occupying a toilet stall.59 Observing that the purpose of using a bathroom involves activities that
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

Id.
391 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1115.
Id. at 1116.
Id.
Kroehler, 391 F. Supp. at 1116.
Id.
Id. at 1117.
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are personal, intimate, and private by their nature, and having determined that the occupation of a bathroom stall warrants a reasonable
expectation of privacy, the court further explained that this privacy
expectation is not lost as a result of a person’s failure to utilize a door
to prevent disclosure of his or her activities.60 Pertinent to the court’s
rationale was the fact that the surveillance at issue enabled the government to view “not only those involved in criminal activity, but also countless innocent and unknowing persons who reasonably expected and were properly entitled to a modicum of privacy.”61
Therefore, explaining that “[t]he Fourth Amendment requires, at a
minimum, the determination by a detached official that there is probable cause warranting a search prior to its commencement, or at least
the presence of those rare exigent circumstances which justify a warrantless search,” the court found “[t]he warrantless and non-selective
search of all individuals who happen[ed] to be in the area [was not]
justified under the circumstances.”62
B.

Application of the Exclusionary Rule Evaded by
the Attenuation Principle

The exclusionary rule is a judicially-crafted mandate which
was “adopted to effectuate [and safeguard] the Fourth Amendment
right of all citizens ‘to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ ”63 When the
exclusionary rule is invoked, “evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment” should be suppressed, as the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that evidence unlawfully obtained
“cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search and seizure.”64 In Wong Sun v. United States,65 the Supreme Court added further clarity to the exclusionary rule’s application. The Court observed that the exclusionary rule applies both to
60

Id.
Id. at 1119; see also Bielicki v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 371 P.2d 288, 290 (Cal.
1962) (noting that the court suppressed the evidence retrieved as a result of surveillance over
toilet stalls on the ground that there was not probable cause to justify the intrusion into the
individuals’ privacy and the surveillance allowed for the observation of the “innocent and
guilty alike”).
62
Kroehler, 391 F. Supp. at 1119.
63
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV)).
64
Id. (citing Weeks v. United States, 34 S. Ct. 341, 346 (1914), overruled by Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
65
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
61
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the evidence “traditionally barred . . . physical, tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion” and
“testimony as to matters observed during an unlawful invasion.”66 In
turn, the Court established precedent that has carried through search
and seizure jurisprudence with great impact, articulating that “[t]he
exclusionary prohibition extends [to both] the indirect [and] the direct
products of such invasions.”67
In Wong Sun, federal narcotics agents observed a suspect over
the course of six weeks and he was subsequently arrested for heroin
possession.68 Thereafter, following the suspect’s arrest, he gave up
the person who he bought the heroin from, which information led the
narcotics agents to the residence and business of the person the suspect identified.69 Thereafter, without a search warrant, the officers
entered the identified seller’s dwelling, at which time the alleged
seller advised the narcotics officers that another individual, Johnny
Yee, was allegedly the supplier of the drugs. 70 Relying on this information, the officers then went to Yee’s residence, recovered several tubes of heroin, and were then directed to the residence of yet
another individual, Wong Sun, who was allegedly the original supplier of the heroin.71 Wong Sun was arrested and convicted along with
Yee.72
At trial, Wong Sun argued the evidence obtained and presented against him, specifically, his unsigned confession which was obtained at the time of his arrest “without probable cause or reasonable
grounds”73 was inadmissible as it was the fruit “of unlawful arrests or
of attendant searches.”74 However, the Court rejected this contention,
observing that although the arrest was in fact unlawfully made, Wong
66
Id. (citing McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir. 1955) (explaining that
there was “no basis in the cases or logic for distinguishing between the introduction into evidence of physical objects illegally taken and the introduction of testimony concerning objects illegally observed”). In Wong Sun, the Court considered the claims of more than one
petitioner, each who alleged that the evidence obtained and presented against them at trial
was unlawfully obtained. Id. at 490-92. However, for the purposes of this case note, only
petitioner Wong Sun’s claim is explored.
67
Id. at 484.
68
Id. at 473.
69
Id. at 473-74.
70
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 474.
71
Id. at 475.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 491.
74
Id. at 477.
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Sun was nevertheless “released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to
make the statement.”75 Thus, relying on the precedent previously set
forth in Nardone v. United States,76 the Court held that “the connection between the arrest and the statement had ‘become so attenuated
as to dissipate the taint.’ ”77 The holding in Wong Sun illustrates how
the United States Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the exclusionary rule as applicable only in limited circumstances to exclude a
limited category of evidence.
In United States v. Crews,78 the Supreme Court again examined the exclusionary rule and attenuation principle from Wong Sun
and Nardone, observing that in addition to direct physical evidence,
“items observed or words overheard in the course of the unlawful activity, [and] confessions or statements of the accused obtained during
an illegal arrest and detention” fall within the exclusionary rule’s
realm and are subject to suppression.79 At issue in Crews was the
constitutionality of “an in-court identification of the accused by the
victim of a crime” where such identification stemmed from an unlawful arrest.”80 The constitutional challenge came as a result of an assault and robbery after which respondent was questioned by the police, “tentatively identified,” questioned a second time, photographed
without the police making a formal arrest or bringing charges, and
subsequently identified which prompted an indictment.81
After adopting “the trial court’s finding that respondent was
detained without probable cause”82 and assessing each element of
“[a] victim’s in-court identification of the accused”,83 the Court con75

Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at at 491.
308 U.S. 338 (1939).
77
Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 491.
78
445 U.S. 463 (1980).
79
Id. at 470 (citing Dunway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (observing that
“[w]hen there is a close causal connection between the illegal seizure and the confession, not
only is exclusion of the evidence more likely to deter similar police misconduct in the future,
but also use of the evidence is more likely to compromise the integrity of the courts”).
80
Id. at 465.
81
Id. at 465-69.
82
Id. at 469.
83
Crews, 445 U.S. at 471.
A victim's in-court identification of the accused has three distinct elements. First, the victim is present at trial to testify as to what transpired
between her and the offender, and to identify the defendant as the culprit.
Second, the victim possesses knowledge of and the ability to reconstruct
the prior criminal occurrence and to identify the defendant from her ob76
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cluded the challenged identification was “not the product of any police misconduct.”84 Rather, explaining that the “the illegal arrest [did
not] infect the victim’s ability to give accurate identification testimony” and recognizing the time lapse between the unconstitutional action and the evidence in question and the number of links in the chain
between each act, the Court found that “the toxin in this case was injected only after the evidentiary bud had blossomed [and] the fruit
served at trial was not poisoned.”85
Thereafter, in New York v. Harris,86 the Court further established that the attenuation principle might permit the government to
introduce a confirmatory identification even where the identification
was unlawfully procured.87 In Harris, the Court accepted the lower
court’s finding that the defendant “did not consent to the police officers’ entry into his home and the conclusion that the police had probable cause to arrest him.”88 However, in assessing and determining
how to resolve the facts before it, the Court stated that it would not
“adopt a ‘per se’ or ‘but for’ rule that would make inadmissible any
evidence, whether tangible or live-witness testimony, which somehow came to light through a chain of causation that began with an illegal arrest.”89
The Court observed that the defendant had not authorized the
police to enter his home and the police did so without a warrant.90
This effectively cast a shadow upon whether all evidence as the result
of an illegal arrest would be deemed the forbidden fruit of such an
unlawful arrest.91 While, the Court recognized that “the indirect
fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when they
bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality,”92
the Court ultimately determined that because the police maintained a
right to question the defendant before arresting him, any information
servations of him at the time of the crime. And third, the defendant is also physically present in the courtroom, so that the victim can observe
him and compare his appearance to that of the offender.
Id.
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.
Id. at 472.
495 U.S. 14 (1990).
Id. at 17.
Id.
Id. at 18 (quoting United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 (1978)).
Id. at 17.
Harris, 495 U.S. at 18 (citing Crews, 445 U.S. at 474).
Id. at 19.
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they got upon questioning him, even after the illegal arrest, was subject to attenuation.93
III.

THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH
A.

Defining an Individual’s Expectation of Privacy by
the Place of Occupancy

In People v. Mercado,94 the court was asked to determine
whether the police, in making an instantaneous investigation into the
men’s rest room at Kennedy Airport, acted unreasonably when standing on top of the commode within a bathroom stall in order to peer
over and into an adjoining stall occupied by the defendant.95 This action was prompted by an unidentified man’s tip to the police that
“there were two men in a toilet stall in the restroom.”96 An officer
entered, confirmed that two men were in fact within one stall, as he
could hear their voices, but was unable to conclusively determine the
substance of their conversation.97
Thereafter, the officer tried “to peer through the space between the door and the frame,” but his view was blocked; he could
however, view the defendant, who was “sitting on top of the flushing
unit with his feet resting on the toilet bowl.”98 The officer then “entered the adjoining stall, stood on the commode and looked down into
the occupied stall.”99 As a result of gaining this view, the officer observed “an open glassine envelope containing white powder”, which
the defendant flushed upon realizing that the officer had discovered
them.100 The men exited the stall upon order and “19 ‘nickel bags’ of
heroin” were retrieved after the police conducted a pat-down
search.101 Over the defendant’s objection at trial that the evidence
used against him had been unlawfully obtained, and thus, required
suppression, he was indicted and sentenced.102
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
501 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1986).
Id. at 28-29.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The issue before the court in Mercado was “whether defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the officer
looked into the stall.”103 Because “[t]he enclosure exists precisely to
insure privacy and to shield its occupant from public view,” the court
explained that “an expectation of privacy in a public rest room stall is
reasonable.”104 The court reasoned that “[o]nce the door is closed, an
individual is entitled to assume that while inside he or she will not be
viewed by others.”105 However, the court also recognized that “since
the Fourth Amendment protects against only unreasonable intrusions,
a search may be justified by the existence of probable cause to believe that a crime has occurred, is occurring or is about to take
place.”106
In order to determine whether the officer had probable cause
the court considered the circumstances of the incident, specifically
noting that the officer (i) was on the job “working in airport security”; (ii) entered the bathroom and peered into the stall to investigate a
tip; and (iii) made observations from which reasonable inferences
could be drawn to conclude that “the stall was not being used for its
intended purpose.”107 Emphasizing that “[p]robable cause does not
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court in found that the
officer had probable cause and his conduct was reasonable under the
circumstances.108 The court in Mercado explained that after the officer’s “suspicions [were] heightened by what he saw and heard from
afar, the officer was not compelled to turn heel and leave the rest
room.”109 Rather, the officer was justified in taking reasonable steps
“to learn what was going on inside” of the stall.110
In People v. Milom,111 the court established that “not every instance of police surveillance in a public rest room constitutes a

103

Id.
Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 29.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 29-30.
108
Id. at 30.
109
Mercado, 501 N.E.2d at 30.
110
Id.; see also People v. Green, 507 N.Y.S.2d 408, 409 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1986) (“Despite the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the restroom stall, the information
received by the police from the victim, when coupled with their own observations, provided
them with a reasonable basis to enter the stall and, upon observing the gun, they had probable cause to arrest the defendant.”).
111
428 N.Y.S.2d 678 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1980).
104
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Fourth Amendment violation.”112 Rather, as is the case with all
Fourth Amendment challenges, whether or not there is an expectation
of privacy and whether or not it is reasonable varies based upon the
underlying circumstances.113 In Milom, an officer looked through the
window of a bar bathroom and observed the defendant in possession
of a white power and snorting that white powder along with several
other individuals.114 The officer then confronted the defendant, confirmed that the white powder was narcotics, which he retrieved from
the defendant a along with a silver measuring spoon and substantial
sum of cash.115 At trial, the defendant argued that the officer’s “surveillance of the rest room constituted a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment [and was] not justified by exigent circumstances and [was conducted] without benefit of a warrant.”116 Although cognizant of the fact that in many, if not most instances, individuals maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy while in a
bathroom, the court focused on the open area in which the defendant
chose to expose and use his drugs.117 Specifically, the court in Milom
noted that the defendant did not engage in conduct privately within a
bathroom stall, but rather occupied the rest room’s “public” area.118
In turn, the court established, “[t]here is no justified expectation of
privacy as to incriminating conduct which occurs in the public area of
a rest room rather than inside one of the stalls.”119
In order to find harmony between the holding in Mercado, the
existing precedent related to bathroom stalls, as reiterated in Milom,
and the court’s conclusion in People v. Saunders,120 it is necessary to
carefully consider the particular facts involved before turning to the
issue before the court. In Saunders, the search and seizure at issue
occurred as a result of the defendant’s visit to the Adolescent Reception Center on Rikers Island.121 The officer on duty at the time of his
visit directed all visitors to dispose of any and all contraband in an
“amnesty box” and advised the visitors that such disposal could be
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 681.
Id. at 680.
Id.
Id.
Milom, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 680.
Id. at 680-81.
Id. at 681.
Id.
531 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
Id. at 988.
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made “with ‘no questions asked.’ ”122 The defendant was also told
that all personal belongings were to be secured in lockers and were
not permitted inside the prison during the visit with an inmate.123
Thereafter the defendant entered the toilet facilities which were located in close proximity to the area which was being patrolled by the
officer on duty.124 The lock on the toilet stall that the defendant occupied “was apparently broken.”125 The officer then entered the toilet
facilities, heard “a loud sniffing sound,” and inquired about it.126
Without any objection, the defendant turned around to face the officer, revealing “a quantity of white powder on the [his] face—more
particularly, on his ‘nose, lip and mouth.’ ”127
The facts in Saunders are important to understand the court’s
holding that the defendant, when occupying the bathroom stall at the
correctional institution, did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.128 In
arriving at this conclusion, the court observed that “one’s expectation
of privacy while within the confines or even upon the perimeter of a
correctional institution is less than such expectation would be outside
the institution.”129 However, the court nevertheless noted that every
Fourth Amendment challenge should be assessed by “an objective
standard [that strives for a balance] between zealous government
agents and private citizens.”130
Thus, turning to the circumstances of this encounter, the court
recognized that the search and seizure was made by “a prison security
officer, [who] as part of his assigned duties, [took] note of something
evident to his sense of hearing.”131 Reasoning that the officer’s conduct was reasonable under the circumstances, the court explained that
“[t]he notion that a prison setting affords the same guarantee of protection from warrantless police intrusion as the sanctity of the home
and/or the privacies of life, on its face, is at odds with both common

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id.
Id.
Id.
Saunders, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 992.
Saunders, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
Id. at 992-93.
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sense and reality.”132
In People v. Diaz,133 the court clarified that there is not “much
distinction between the privacy which people have a right to expect
in public restrooms from that which they hope to find in fitting
rooms.”134 In Diaz, a “special patrolman” in a department store, assigned to prevent theft and to apprehend those who commit such a
crime, witnessed the defendants place a scarf into a knapsack.135 After viewing the defendants enter a fitting room with items, the special
patrolman gained a vantage point above the fitting room and viewed
the defendants remove price tags from the clothing that they proceeded to place in a knapsack.136 As a result of discovering the theft that
occurred, the defendants were detained and arrested.137
When the circumstances preceding the arrest were later challenged at trial, the court first observed, “there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy as to those things which are fully disclosed
and generally noticeable by the public at large.”138 Thus, the court
explained, crucial in determining whether a reasonable expectation of
privacy exists involves looking to “the nature of the activity involved
and whether an individual engaged in that activity may reasonably
believe that he may perform it in private.”139 The court recognized,
“[t]he function of a fitting room is, after all, to provide a place where
a customer can try on items of clothing in private, undisturbed from
the observation of others.”140 The court also considered that clothing
stores in particular have had great difficulty “in dealing with the
problem of theft.” However, observing that “there are far less intrusive security measures which [stores] can utilize [rather] than resorting to surreptitious spying on shoppers as they undress,” the court
found the fitting room surveillance was unreasonable and violated the
defendants’ expectation of privacy deserving of Fourth Amendment
protection.141

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id.
376 N.Y.S.2d 849 (Crim. Ct. 1975).
Id. at 854.
Id. at 850-51.
Id. at 851.
Id.
Diaz, 376 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (citing Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968)).
Id. at 855.
Id.
Id.
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Application of the Attenuation Principle

In People v. Gethers,142 the court applied the exclusionary
rule and suppressed an “on-the-scene identification . . . as a product
of [an] illegal arrest.”143 The case came before the court on a motion
to suppress both tangible evidence and an identification that resulted
from a “buy and bust” drug operation in Manhattan.144 The undercover detective bought illegal narcotics and subsequently relayed to
another officer the descriptions of both the defendant and another
man, who were arrested by that officer and led to a street corner in
order for the undercover officer to confirm the suspects’ identification.145 The undercover officer then identified the two suspects as the
dealers.146
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, the court determined that
the police did not have probable cause to arrest the two individuals.147
The court further observed that “[t]he casual link between the arrest
and identification is obvious and unattenuated.”148 In its conclusion,
the court noted that the illegal seizure and detention of the defendants
not only made the identification possible, but was done for the purpose of displaying them to the undercover officer and thereby securing a pretrial identification to be used at the trial to bolster her incourt identification.”149 Thus, the court suppressed the confirmatory
identification and ordered that an independent source hearing be held
to determine whether the officer would be permitted to make an “incourt identification . . . sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.”150
However, as demonstrated by the court’s ruling in People v.
Ramos,151 circumstances arise in which the exclusionary rule will not
mandate suppression of evidence despite the fact that it was unlawfully come upon. In Ramos, the court concluded that the defendant’s
arrest was unlawful because the police did not have a warrant when
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

654 N.E.2d 102 (N.Y. 1995).
Id. at 103.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gethers, 654 N.E.2d at 104.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 105 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
613 N.Y.S.2d 870 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1994).
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they entered premises “in which [the defendant] had a legitimate expectation of privacy.”152 Therefore, since the arrest was improper,
the court established that the physical evidence seized from the premises at that time was “fruit” of the unlawful arrest, and thus, required
suppression.153
However, noting that “a confirmatory identification would
normally be suppressed if defendant had been unlawfully detained by
the police,”154 the court nevertheless concluded that under the facts
presented there was “no need to suppress the identification under the
Fourth Amendment.”155 Rather, emphasizing that “the identification
took place after the parties left the apartment sufficiently dissipated
the taint of the warrantless entry.”156
V.

CONCLUSION

As demonstrated by the case law and various doctrines explored herein, both federal and New York State courts have endeavored to strike a balance between the need for the police to have some
leeway to conduct warrantless searches and the need to safeguard the
rights intended by our framers to be afforded to every citizen of the
United States, whether suspected, found guilty, or otherwise innocent
to the criminal activity at issue. The court in Hemmings arrived at its
decision after a careful analysis of the specific circumstances preceding and surrounding the defendant’s encounter with the police. Absent exigent circumstances or at least probable cause to justify the nature of the intrusion at issue, the court rendered its decision in an
effort to protect the defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
The court’s ruling is not only consistent with, but flows directly from
the seminal decision of the United States Supreme Court in Katz—
what an individual “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected”157—
especially when that individual shuts the door behind him.

152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at 872.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ramos, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
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